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Abstract
This study explores how agricultural technology a¤ects the endogenous takeo¤ of
an economy in the Schumpeterian growth model. Due to the subsistence requirement
for agricultural consumption, an improvement in agricultural technology leads to a
reallocation of labor from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. Therefore,
the agricultural improvement expands the rm size in the industrial sector, which
determines the incentives for innovation and triggers an endogenous transition from
stagnation to growth. Calibrating the model to US data for a quantitative analysis,
we nd that without the reallocation of labor from agriculture to the industrial sector
in the early 19th century, the takeo¤ of the US economy would have been delayed by
about four decades.
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The spectacular industrial revolution would not have been possible without
the agricultural revolution that preceded it. [...] The introduction of the turnip
[...] made possible a change in crop rotation which [...] brought about a tremen-
dous rise in agricultural productivity. As a result, more food could be grown
with much less manpower. Manpower was released for capital construction. The
growth of industry would not have been possible without the turnip and other
improvements in agriculture. Nurkse (1953, p. 52-53)
1 Introduction
According to Nurkse (1953), improvements in agricultural technology that released labor
from agriculture to the industrial sector were crucial for the industrial revolution. The
industrial revolution sparked the great divergence discussed in Pomeranz (2001) and centuries
of sustained economic growth. Modern growth economics has developed ambitious models
that capture these facts and allow investigation of the forces driving the process. Typically
such models build on the theory of endogenous technological change pioneered by Romer
(1990). Since at its core the theory has dynamic increasing returns, it identies the size of
the market in which rms operate as a (if not the) crucial factor determining the incentives
for innovation. A spectacular application of these ideas is the Unied Growth Theory of
Galor and Weil (2000); see also Galor (2005, 2011). Models in this tradition produce an
endogenous takeo¤ and allow study of the transition of an economy from stagnation to
growth. Following these two inuential branches of studies on economic growth, Peretto
(2015) develops a Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ in which rm size
determines the incentives for innovation; see Cohen and Klepper (1996a, b) and Laincz and
Peretto (2006) for evidence. In this study, we use this model to formalize Nurkses idea and
then quantitatively evaluate the e¤ects of agricultural technology.
In Peretto (2015), rm size is increasing in the population size and decreasing in the
number of rms. Therefore, holding other things constant, a larger population tends to give
rise to an earlier transition from stagnation to growth. However, countries with large popu-
lation, such as China and India, did not experience an early industrial takeo¤ partly because
the vast majority of their population was in agriculture, which is not relevant for rm size in
the industrial sector. Therefore, we introduce an agricultural sector into the Schumpeterian
growth model of endogenous takeo¤. By preserving the analytical tractability of the Peretto
model, we derive a closed-form solution of the equilibrium growth rate throughout the entire
transition from stagnation to the balanced growth path. We show that it is the evolution of
rm size in the industrial sector that determines the incentives for innovation. We use this
growth-theoretic framework to explore how agricultural technology a¤ects the endogenous
takeo¤ of an economy. In summary, we nd that an increase in the level of agricultural
technology leads to an earlier takeo¤ of the economy. The intuition of this result can be
explained as follows.
Due to the subsistence requirement for agricultural consumption, the industrial sector is
small relative to the agricultural sector when the level of agricultural technology is low. An
improvement in agricultural technology leads to a reallocation of labor from the agricultural
sector to the industrial sector. As a result, the agricultural improvement expands rm size
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in the industrial sector, which determines the incentives for innovation. As rm size in the
industrial sector becomes su¢ciently large, rms start to invest in innovation, which in turn
triggers an endogenous transition from stagnation to growth.
We also calibrate the model to US data in order to perform a quantitative analysis. At
the beginning of the 19th century, the agricultural share of the US workforce was about
80%; see Baten (2016). Then, the agricultural share of the US workforce decreased to about
70% in 1830 and 60% in 1840; see Lebergott (1966) and Weiss (1986). We nd that this
reallocation of labor from agriculture to the industrial sector was a useful driving force for
the takeo¤ of the US economy. Without this reallocation of labor from agriculture to the
industrial sector, the takeo¤ of the US economy would have been delayed by about four
decades. Finally, we derive a formula from our model to show that a one-fth increase in
industrial employment causes an earlier takeo¤ by about a decade.
This study relates to the literature on endogenous technological change. Romer (1990)
is the seminal study and develops the rst R&D-based growth model in which innovation
is driven by the invention of new products (i.e., horizontal innovation). Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) develop the Schum-
peterian growth model in which innovation is driven by the quality improvement of prod-
ucts (i.e., vertical innovation). Peretto (1994, 1998, 1999), Smulders and van de Klundert
(1995) and Howitt (1999) combine the two dimensions of innovation to develop the second-
generation Schumpeterian growth model.1 The present study contributes to this literature by
incorporating an agricultural sector into the Schumpeterian growth model with vertical and
horizontal innovation to show that it is the rm size in the industrial sector that determines
the incentives for innovation. We nd that the scale-invariant property arising from the two
dimensions of innovation in the industrial sector is important in allowing the allocation of
resources to a¤ect the endogenous takeo¤ but not economic growth in the long run.
This study also relates to the literature on endogenous takeo¤. Seminal studies in this
literature include Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002), who develop unied
growth theory.2 Unied growth theory shows that the quality-quantity tradeo¤ in chil-
drearing and the accumulation of human capital enable an economy to escape from the
Malthusian trap and experience an endogenous transition from stagnation to growth.3 The
present study explores technological progress as an alternative channel for the endogenous
takeo¤ of an economy. The Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ is based
on Peretto (2015).4 We incorporate an agricultural sector into the Peretto model and show
that it is the rm size in the industrial sector that a¤ects the endogenous takeo¤. In other
words, we formalize the idea of Nurkse (1953) and Murphy et al. (1989) in a dynamic general
equilibrium model, which allows us to quantify the e¤ect of agricultural technology on the
industrialization of an economy.5
1Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008, 2010) and Ang and Madsen (2011)
provide supportive empirical evidence for the second-generation Schumpeterian model.
2See also Jones (2001) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) for other early studies on endogenous takeo¤.
3See Galor and Mountford (2008), Galor et al. (2009) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) for evidence and
Galor (2011) for a comprehensive review of unied growth theory.
4Chu et al. (2020) explore the e¤ects of patent protection on endogenous takeo¤ in the Peretto model.
5See Lagakos and Waugh (2013) for an interesting study that explores the large productivity di¤erences
in agriculture across countries.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Schumpeterian
growth model. Section 3 explores the e¤ects of agricultural technology. Section 4 performs
a quantitative analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeo¤
The Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ is based on Peretto (2015). The
model features both vertical and horizontal innovation. In the Peretto model, whether the
economy experiences innovation depends on the rm size in the economy. By incorporating
an agricultural sector with subsistence consumption into the model, we show that it is the
rm size in the industrial sector that determines innovation and the endogenous takeo¤ of
the economy.
2.1 Household
The economy features a representative household,6 which has a population size of Lt that
grows at an exogenous rate  > 0. The household has a Stone-Geary utility function:
U =
Z
1
0
e ( )t [ln ct +  ln(qt   )] dt, (1)
where ct denotes per capita consumption of an industrial good (numeraire) and qt denotes
per capita consumption of an agricultural good for which there is a subsistence consumption
level determined by the parameter  > 0.7 The parameter  >  is the subjective discount
rate, whereas the parameter  > 0 determines the importance of agricultural consumption
relative to industrial consumption.
The household maximizes utility subject to an asset-accumulation equation:
_at = (rt   )at + wt   ct   ptqt, (2)
where at is the value of assets owned by each member of the household, and rt is the real
interest rate. Each member of the household supplies one unit of labor to earn the wage
income wt. pt is the price of the agricultural good. Standard dynamic optimization yields
the growth path of industrial consumption ct given by
_ct
ct
= rt    (3)
and also the demand for agricultural consumption qt given by
qt =  +
ct
pt
. (4)
6See Chu and Peretto (2019) for an analysis of heterogeneous households in the Peretto model.
7This is a common feature of structural change models; see Matsuyama (1992), Laitner (2000) and
Kongsamut et al. (2001). These interesting studies focus on the implications of structural change on
economic growth but not endogenous takeo¤.
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2.2 Agricultural production
The production function of the agricultural good follows from Lagakos and Waugh (2013):
Qt = ALq;t, (5)
where the parameter A >  denotes the level of agricultural technology. Lq;t is the amount
of labor allocated to the agricultural sector.8 This sector is perfectly competitive, and the
zero-prot condition is given by
wt = ptA, (6)
which equates the wage rate to the value of the marginal product of agricultural labor.
2.3 Industrial production
This sector is also perfectly competitive. The production function of the industrial good is
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)

Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t=N
1 
t
1 
di, (7)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Xt (i) is the quantity of non-durable intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt].
The productivity of Xt (i) depends on its own quality Zt (i) as well as the average quality
of all intermediate goods Zt 
R Nt
0
Zt (j) dj=Nt, which captures technology spillovers. The
parameter  determines the private return to quality, and hence, 1  determines the degree
of technology spillovers. The parameter  determines a congestion e¤ect 1  of variety. As
we will show, the social return to variety is measured by .
Prot maximization yields the conditional demand functions for Ly;t andXt (i) as follows:
wt = (1  )
Yt
Ly;t
, (8)
Xt (i) =


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t
N1 t
, (9)
where Pt (i) is the price of Xt (i). Perfect competition implies that rms pay (1  )Yt =
wtLy;t for industrial labor and Yt =
R Nt
0
Pt (i)Xt (i) di for intermediate goods.
2.4 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
There is a continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt]. A monopolistic rm
produces di¤erentiated intermediate good i with a linear technology that requiresXt (i) units
of the industrial good to produce Xt (i) units of intermediate good i. In other words, the
marginal cost for the monopolistic rm in industry i to produce Xt (i) with quality Zt (i) is
one. The monopolistic rm also needs to incur Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of the industrial good as
8For tractability, we do not consider land in our model. See Vollrath (2011) for an interesting study that
explores the e¤ects of land intensity and labor intensity in agriculture on industrialization.
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a xed operating cost. To improve the quality of its products, the rm devotes It (i) units
of the industrial good to in-house R&D. We specify the innovation function as
_Zt (i) = It (i) . (10)
The rms (before-R&D) prot ow at time t is
t (i) = [Pt (i)  1]Xt (i)  Z

t (i)Z
1 
t . (11)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt (i) =
Z
1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s (i)  Is (i)] ds. (12)
The monopolistic rm maximizes (12) subject to (10) and (11). We solve this dynamic
optimization problem in the proof of Lemma 1 and nd that the unconstrained prot-
maximizing markup ratio is 1=. However, competitive rms can also produce Xt(i) with the
same quality Zt(i) as the monopolistic rm,
9 but they face a higher unit cost of production
given by  > 1. To price the competitive rms out of the market, the monopolistic rm sets
its price as follows:
Pt(i) = min f; 1=g . (13)
For the rest of the analysis, we assume  < 1= implying that Pt(i) = .
Following the standard approach in the literature, we consider a symmetric equilibrium
in which Zt (i) = Zt for i 2 [0; Nt] and the size of each intermediate-good rm is identical
across all industries Xt (i) = Xt.
10 From (9) and Pt (i) = , the quality-adjusted rm size is
Xt
Zt
=



1=(1 )
Ly;t
N1 t
. (14)
We dene the following transformed variable:
xt  
1=(1 ) Lt
N1 t
= 1=(1 )
Lt
Ly;t
Xt
Zt
, (15)
which is a state variable determined by the ratio Lt=N
1 
t . In Lemma 1, the rate of return on
quality-improving R&D is increasing in the rm size measured by xtly;t, where ly;t  Ly;t=Lt
is the industrial share of labor, which captures the idea that agricultural labor does not
contribute to the rm size in the industrial sector.
Lemma 1 The rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D is
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

  1
1=(1 )
xtly;t   

. (16)
Proof. See Appendix A.
9Here we assume di¤usion of technologies from the monopolistic rm to competitive rms in each industry.
10Symmetry also implies t (i) = t, It (i) = It and Vt (i) = Vt.
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2.5 Entrants
We follow previous studies to assume that entrants have access to aggregate technology Zt
in order to ensure symmetric equilibrium at any time t. A new rm pays Xt units of the
industrial good to enter the market with a new variety of intermediate goods and set up its
operation.  > 0 is an entry-cost parameter. The asset-pricing equation is given by
rt =
t   It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (17)
When entry is positive, the entry condition is given by
Vt = Xt. (18)
Substituting (10), (11), (15), (18) and Pt =  into (17) yields the return on entry as
ret =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 
+ zt
xtly;t

+ zt +
_xt
xt
+
_ly;t
ly;t
, (19)
where zt  _Zt=Zt is the growth rate of aggregate quality.
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; qt; ct; Yt; Xt; It; Ly;t; Lq;tg and prices frt; wt; pt; Pt; Vtg
such that
 the household consumes fqt; ctg to maximize utility taking frt; wt; ptg as given;
 competitive rms produce Qt to maximize prots taking fwt; ptg as given;
 competitive rms produce Yt to maximize prots taking fwt; Ptg as given;
 intermediate-good rms choose fPt; Itg to maximize Vt taking rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that atLt = NtVt;
 the labor market clears such that Lq;t + Ly;t = Lt;
 the market of the agricultural good clears such that qtLt = ALq;t; and
 the market of the industrial good also clears such that
Yt = ctLt +Nt (Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt. (20)
7
2.7 Aggregation
Substituting (9) and Pt =  into (7) and imposing symmetry yield the aggregate production
function of the industrial good as follows:
Yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt ZtLy;t. (21)
The growth rate of industrial output per capita (i.e., yt = Yt=Lt) is
gt 
_yt
yt
= nt + zt +
_ly;t
ly;t
, (22)
which is determined by the variety growth rate nt  _Nt=Nt, the quality growth rate zt and
the growth rate of the industrial labor share ly;t.
2.8 Labor allocation
Equating the labor demand functions in (6) and (8) yields
pt =
(1  )Yt
ALy;t
. (23)
Then, substituting the supply of Qt in (5) and the relative price pt in (23) into the demand
function for qt in (4) yields the industrial labor share ly;t as
ly;t =
Ly;t
Lt
=

1 +

1  
ct
yt

 1 
1 

A

, (24)
which shows that for a given consumption-output ratio ct=yt, the industrial labor share ly;t
is increasing in agricultural technology A. This pattern of sectoral reallocation is due to
the subsistence consumption parameter  > 0 under which an improvement in agricultural
technology releases labor from agriculture to the industrial sector.
3 Agricultural revolution and endogenous takeo¤
The dynamics of the economy is determined by the dynamics of the state variable xt, which
is stable and gradually increases from an initial value x0 towards a steady-state value x
 if
the following parameter condition holds:
 >
1


  1  

+

1  


>   1. (25)
In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the economy begins in a pre-industrial era in
which the growth rate of industrial output per capita is zero. Then, the economy enters
the rst industrial era in which new products are being developed and the growth rate of
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industrial output per capita becomes positive. After that, the growth rate rises further as the
economy enters the second industrial era in which the quality of products is being improved
(i.e., vertical innovation) while new products continue to be developed (i.e., horizontal inno-
vation).11 Finally, the economy converges to the balanced growth path that features both
vertical and horizontal innovation. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic path of the equilibrium
growth rate gt from stagnation to long-run growth g
. In what follows, we show that an
agricultural revolution gives rise to an earlier takeo¤ of the economy.
Figure 1: Dynamic path of economic growth
3.1 The pre-industrial era
The economy begins in a pre-industrial era, in which neither horizontal innovation nor ver-
tical innovation has been activated. In this pre-industrial era, the rm size xtly;t is so small
that monopolistic rms cannot earn a positive prot; i.e.,
xtly;t < 
1=(1 )=(  1), t < 0.
Therefore, all intermediate goods N0 are produced by competitive rms, which do not incur
the operating cost and simply price the intermediate goods at their marginal cost such that
Pt(i) = . In this case, the intermediate-good sector generates zero prot, and the value of
monopolistic rms is zero. As a result, industrial consumption in the pre-industrial era is
ct = wtly;t = (1  )yt, (26)
which implies a consumption-output ratio of ct=yt = 1  .
Substituting (26) into (24) yields the equilibrium level of industrial labor share in the
pre-industrial era:
ly =
1
1 + 

1 

A

, (27)
11Here we consider the realistic case in which the creation of products happens before the quality improve-
ment of products.
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which is stationary and increasing in the level of agricultural technology A. The growth rate
of industrial output per capita is then
gt = nt + zt +
_ly;t
ly;t
= 0 (28)
because nt = zt = _ly;t=ly;t = 0 in the pre-industrial era. Finally, the inequality for t < 0
can now be written as the following condition:
A <

1  1
 1
(1 + )1=(1 )=xt
. (29)
In other words, when the level of agricultural technology is low, the economy remains in an
equilibrium with zero economic growth because the rm size in the industrial sector is not
large enough to provide su¢cient incentives for innovation.
3.2 The rst industrial era
Suppose agricultural technology improves and the level of A increases to a point in which
the rm size xtly;t becomes su¢ciently large for horizontal innovation (but not vertical inno-
vation) to occur. We refer to this as the rst industrial era. When horizontal innovation is
activated, the consumption-output ratio ct=yt jumps to the steady-state value in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 When variety innovation is activated, the consumption-output ratio jumps to
ct
yt
=
(  )

+ 1  . (30)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In this case, the equilibrium level of industrial labor share is given by
ly =
1
1 + 

1 +  


1 
 1  
A

. (31)
which continues to be stationary and increasing in agricultural technology A. In the rst
industrial era, the rm size xtl

y is su¢ciently large for horizontal innovation to be viable,
which requires12
A >

1  1
 1 ( )
h
1 + 

1 +  


1 
i
1=(1 )=xt
. (32)
12There exists an intermediate range of A between (29) and (32), in which monopolistic rms in N0 could
earn positive prots but do not invest in innovation yet. We follow Chu and Peretto (2019) to assume that
intermediate goods are produced by competitive rms until innovation occurs because only innovation allows
the industrial sector to be monopolized. In Appendix B, we consider an extension of the model that does
not rely on this assumption and show that the dynamics of the economy actually becomes less realistic.
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Intuitively, when the level of agricultural technology increases, the economy reallocates labor
from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. If the rm size in the industrial sector
is large enough, it would provide su¢cient incentives for innovation to occur.
When the inequality in (32) holds, the variety growth rate can be derived from (19) as13
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 

xtly

+    > 0, (33)
which is increasing in agricultural technology A via industrial labor share ly and also depends
on the state variable xt. The growth rate of industrial output per capita is gt = nt > 0.
Figure 2 presents the time path of the growth rate gt when A increases at time t and causes
the economy to escape from the pre-industrial era and enter the rst industrial era.
Figure 2: Agricultural improvement (case 1)
3.3 The second industrial era
Suppose agricultural technology A increases to an even higher level in which the rm size xtl

y
becomes su¢ciently large for both horizontal and vertical innovation to occur simultaneously.
We refer to this as the second industrial era. Given the presence of horizontal innovation, the
consumption-output ratio ct=yt continues to be given by the steady-state value in Lemma
2, whereas the industrial labor share ly is given by (31). In this era, the rm size xtl

y is
su¢ciently large for vertical innovation to be also viable, which requires
A >

1 
h
1 + 

1 +  


1 
i

=xt
. (34)
where the composite parameter 
 is dened as

  arg
!
solve

  1
1=(1 )
!   
 
 
1=(1 )
!

=    (  )

.
13Here we use ret = rt = + gt = + nt, zt = 0 and _xt=xt =   (1  )nt.
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When the inequality in (34) holds, the growth rate of industrial output per capita is
determined by the rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D such that14
gt = 

  1
1=(1 )
xtl

y   

   > 0, (35)
which is also increasing in agricultural technology A via industrial labor share ly and depends
on the state variable xt. Equation (35) implies that the quality growth rate zt is given by
zt = gt   nt, (36)
where gt is derived in (35) and the variety growth rate nt can be derived from (19) as
15
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
 
+ zt
xtly

+    > 0. (37)
Equations (35)-(37) determine the quality growth rate zt as a function of the rm size xtl

y.
The inequality in (34) ensures that zt > 0.
16 Figure 3 presents the time path of the growth
rate of industrial output per capita when A increases at time t and causes the economy to
escape from the pre-industrial era and directly enter the second industrial era.
Figure 3: Agricultural improvement (case 2)
3.4 Balanced growth path
In the long run, the state variable xt converges to its steady-state value x
, implying that
the variety growth rate nt converges to =(1  ).
17 We can then compute the steady-state
equilibrium value of the rm size xly given by
18
xly = 
1=(1 ) (1  )  [+ =(1  )]
(1  )(  1)   [+ =(1  )]
. (38)
14Here we use rqt = rt = + gt.
15Here we use ret = rt = + gt = + nt + zt and _xt=xt =   (1  )nt.
16Derivations are available upon request.
17Recall that xt  
1=(1 )Lt=N
1 
t , and the growth rate of Lt is .
18Here we use (35)-(37) to derive nt and then set n
 = =(1  ) to derive the steady-state xly.
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The steady-state rm size xly in turn determines the steady-state equilibrium growth rate
of industrial output per capita as
g = 

(  1)
(1  )  [+ =(1  )]
(1  )(  1)   [+ =(1  )]
  

   > 0, (39)
which is independent of agricultural technology A due to the scale-invariant property of the
Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure.
Proposition 1 summarizes all the results in Section 3.
Proposition 1 The economy begins in a pre-industrial era without innovation. Then, the
economy enters the rst industrial era with horizontal innovation. Finally, the economy
enters the second industrial era with both vertical and horizontal innovation before converging
to the balanced growth path. An improvement in agricultural technology gives rise to an earlier
takeo¤ but does not a¤ect long-run economic growth.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Quantitative analysis
In the early 19th century, the agricultural share of the US workforce decreased from about
80% to 60%.19 We perform a counterfactual analysis on how large an e¤ect this reallocation
of labor from agriculture to the industrial sector had on the takeo¤ of the US economy.
Recall that the rm size, which determines the timing of the takeo¤, is captured by
xtly;t = xt(1  lq;t), (40)
where lq;t  Lq;t=Lt is the agricultural labor share. In the proof of Proposition 1, we show
that the takeo¤ occurs when xtly;t reaches the threshold 
1=(1 )=[   1   (   )].20 A
decrease in the agricultural labor share lq;t from 80% to 60% translates to an increase in the
industrial labor share ly;t from 20% to 40%,
21 which expands the rm size xtly;t by a factor
of 2 for a given xt. In the pre-industrial era, the state variable xt increases at the population
growth rate . In the US, the long-run population growth rate is 1.8%.22 Therefore, without
the increase in the industrial labor share ly;t, the state variable xt would take
t =
ln 2

=
0:7
1:8%
= 39 years
19See Baten (2016), Lebergott (1966) and Weiss (1986).
20See (A10) in Appendix A.
21Here we are putting manufacturing and services together as the industrial sector that requires innovation;
see e.g., United Nations (2011) for a review on the importance of innovation in the services sector. Kongsamut
et al. (2001) show that manufacturing and services require the same technology growth rate in order for a
balanced growth path to exist in their model.
22Data source: Maddison Project Database.
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to increase by a factor of 2. In other words, without the reallocation of labor from agriculture
to the industrial sector in the early 19th century, the takeo¤ of the US economy would have
been delayed by about four decades. Furthermore, we can derive the following formula:23
t =
ln(1 + )




years, (41)
where  is the percent change in ly;t. For example, given a population growth rate  of 1.8%,
a one-fth increase in industrial employment causes an earlier takeo¤ by about a decade.
We now calibrate the rest of the model to data in the US economy in order to perform a
quantitative analysis. In addition to the population growth rate , the model also features
the following parameters: f; ; ; ; ; ; ; g.24 We set the discount rate  to a conventional
value of 0.05. We follow Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the degree of technology spillovers
1    to 0.833 and the social return of variety  to 0.25. Then, we calibrate  using the
current agricultural share of GDP in the US, which is about 1%.25 Furthermore, we calibrate
f; ; g by matching the following moments of the US economy: 60% for the labor income
share of GDP, 62% for the consumption share of GDP, and 1% for the long-run growth rate
of technology. Finally, we calibrate the markup ratio  by matching the average growth
rates of the simulated path from our model and the historical path in the US.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
        
0.018 0.050 0.167 0.250 0.016 0.404 2.547 1.212 1.630
To explore how well our model matches the historical path of the growth rate in the US,
we rst use historical data to calibrate a time path for the subsistence ratio =A. Specically,
we calibrate the initial value of =A using an agricultural labor share of 80% at the beginning
of the 19th century; see Baten (2016). Then, we use an agricultural labor share of 60% in
1840 and 53% in 1860 in Lebergott (1966) and Weiss (1986) and also an agricultural share
of GDP of 30% in 1900, 20% in 1920-1930, 10% in 1950 and 2% in 1980 in Kongsamut et
al. (2001) to compute a piecewise linear path of =A. Based on this imputed path of =A,
Figure 4 simulates the path of the agricultural share of GDP, which decreases from about
70% in the early 19th century to 1% at the end of the 20th century as in the US data.
Figure 4: Agricultural share of GDP
23It is useful to note that the approximation ln(1 + )   only holds when  is small.
24There is also the subsistence ratio =A, which we will calibrate using historical data.
25Here we assume that the subsistence requirement is no longer binding in modern days; i.e., =A! 0.
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Figure 5 presents the simulated path of the growth rate of industrial output per worker
and the HP-lter trend of the US growth rate26 along with a simulated path of the growth
rate without agricultural improvement (i.e., =A remains at its initial value). Here we pick
an initial value x0 such that the takeo¤ of the economy occurs before the mid-19th century.
Following the occurrence of horizontal innovation, vertical innovation also starts to happen
half a decade later. After that the economy keeps growing and reaches a growth rate as high
as 3% due to the expansion of the industrial sector, which helps to accelerate the rate of
innovation. Around the time of the Great Depression in the 20th century, there is a pause
in the reallocation of labor from agriculture to the industrial sector, which translates into a
temporary slow down in technological progress before a recovery. Before the end of the 20th
century, the growth rate of the economy gradually falls towards the long-run growth rate
due to the deceleration of sectoral reallocation. This simulated pattern replicates the data
reasonably well with the average growth rate increasing from 1.08% in the 19th century to
2.24% in the 20th century before decreasing to 1.04% in the 21st century, whereas the corre-
sponding data are 1.20%, 2.12% and 1.13% in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries respectively.
In contrast, the simulated path of the growth rate without agricultural improvement cannot
capture this inverted-U pattern in the data.
Figure 5: Economic growth
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a Schumpeterian growth model with both agricultural and
industrial sectors in which the rm size in the industrial sector determines the endogenous
takeo¤ of an economy. This growth-theoretic framework is motivated by the observation
that countries with large population, such as China and India, did not experience an early
industrial takeo¤. Our explanation is that the vast majority of their population being in
26Unfortunately, we dont have historical data on labor productivity growth in the US, so we use data on
the growth rate of output per capita as a proxy.
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agriculture did not contribute to the rm size in the industrial sector. We have used our
model to explore how an agricultural revolution a¤ects the timing of endogenous takeo¤ and
found that a sectoral reallocation that expands the rm size in the industrial sector leads to
an earlier transition from stagnation to growth. Our quantitative analysis indicates that the
decline in the agricultural share of the US workforce in the early 19th century contributed
to the takeo¤ of the US economy. Without the reallocation of labor from agriculture to the
industrial sector, the takeo¤ of the US economy would have been delayed by four decades.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. The current-value Hamiltonian for monopolistic rm i is
Ht (i) = t (i)  It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) + t (i) [  Pt (i)] , (A1)
where t (i) is the multiplier on Pt (i)  . We substitute (9)-(11) into (A1) and derive
@Ht (i)
@Pt (i)
= 0)
@t (i)
@Pt (i)
= t (i) , (A2)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A3)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[Pt (i)  1]


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
Ly;t
N1 t
  
)
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t = rtt (i) 
_t (i) . (A4)
If Pt (i) < , then t (i) = 0. In this case, @t (i) =@Pt (i) = 0 yields Pt (i) = 1=. If the
constraint on Pt (i) is binding, then t (i) > 0. In this case, we have Pt (i) = . Therefore,
we have proven (13). Then, the assumption  < 1= implies Pt (i) = . Substituting (A3),
(15) and Pt (i) =  into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield (16), where ly;t  Ly;t=Lt.
Proof of Lemma 2. The value of assets owned by each member of the household is
at = VtNt=Lt. (A5)
If nt > 0, then Vt = Xt in (18) holds. Substituting (18) and XtNt = Yt into (A5) yields
at = XtNt=Lt = (=) Yt=Lt = (=) yt, (A6)
which implies that at=yt is constant. Substituting (A6), (3) and (8) into (2) yields
_yt
yt
=
_at
at
= rt   +
wtly;t + wtlq;t   ct   ptqt
at
=
_ct
ct
+   +
(1  )

 


ct
yt
, (A7)
where we have also used wtLq;t = ptQt. Equation (A7) can be rearranged as
_ct
ct
 
_yt
yt
=


ct
yt
 
(1  )

  (  ) , (A8)
which shows that the dynamics of ct=yt is characterized by saddle-point stability such that
ct=yt jumps to its steady-state value in (30) whenever nt > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1. In the pre-industrial era, the rm size xtly is not su¢ciently large
for horizontal and vertical innovation to be viable such that the variety growth rate and the
quality growth rate are both zero (i.e., nt = zt = 0). In this case, the industrial labor share
ly is given by (27) and the state variable xt = 
1=(1 )Lt=N
1 
0 increases at the population
growth rate . Therefore, in the pre-industrial era, the dynamics of xt is simply
_xt = xt > 0. (A9)
In the rst industrial era, the rm size xtl

y becomes su¢ciently large for horizontal
innovation (but not vertical innovation) to be viable such that nt > 0 and zt = 0. In this
case, the variety growth rate nt is given by (33), which is positive if and only if
27
xt >
1=(1 )=ly
  1  (  )
 xN > x0, (A10)
where ly is given by (31) and increasing in A. The dynamics of xt = 
1=(1 )Lt=N
1 
t is
_xt = [  (1  )nt]xt =
1  


1=(1 )
ly
 

  1  

+

1  

xt

> 0, (A11)
which uses (33) for nt.
In the second industrial era, the rm size xtl

y becomes su¢ciently large for both horizontal
and vertical innovation to be viable such that nt > 0 and zt > 0. In this case, the quality
growth rate zt is given by (36), which is positive if and only if
28
xt >


ly
 xZ > xN , (A12)
where ly is given by (31) and the composite parameter 
 is dened as before:

  arg
!
solve

  1
1=(1 )
!   
 
 
1=(1 )
!

=    (  )

.
We use (35)-(37) to derive nt and the linearized dynamics of xt = 
1=(1 )Lt=N
1 
t as
_xt =
1  


(1  ) 

+

1  

1=(1 )
ly
 

(1  ) (  1)  

+

1  

xt

 0,
(A13)
where we have used 1=(1 )=
 
xtl

y

= 0.
Given (25), the autonomous dynamics of xt is stable and captured by (A9), (A11) and
(A13). Given an initial value x0, the state variable xt increases according to (A9) until xt
reaches the rst threshold xN , which is decreasing in A via l

y. Then, xt increases according to
(A11) until xt reaches the second threshold xZ , which is also decreasing in A via l

y. Finally,
xt increases according to (A13) until xt converges to its steady-state value x
 in (38).
27It is useful to note that (A10) is equivalent to (32).
28It is useful to note that (A12) is equivalent to (34).
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we extend the baseline model to allow for the possibility that in the
pre-industrial era (i.e., nt = zt = 0), monopolistic prots become positive (i.e., t > 0)
before the takeo¤ occurs. When nt = 0, the entry condition in (18) does not hold. However,
the asset-pricing equation in (17) still holds and becomes
rt =
t
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
, (B1)
where It = zt = 0. We use (A5) and nt = 0 to derive _at=at = _Vt=Vt    and then substitute
this equation into (2) to obtain
_Vt
Vt
   =
_at
at
= rt   +
wtly;t + wtlq;t   ptqt   ct
at
. (B2)
Substituting (B1) into (B2) yields
ct =
t
Vt
at + wtly;t =
Nt
Lt
t + (1  ) yt, (B3)
where we have used (A5), wtlq;t = ptqt and wtly;t = (1  ) yt. Then, substituting (11) and
Pt =  into (B3) yields
ct =
NtXt (  1  Zt=Xt)
Lt
+(1  ) yt = 
=(1 )

  1
1=(1 )
 

xtly;t

yt+(1  ) yt, (B4)
where the second equality uses Yt = NtXt and (15). The consumption-output ratio is
ct
yt
= =(1 )

  1
1=(1 )
 

xtly;t

+ 1  , (B5)
which would increase from (26) to (30) if the rm size xtly;t increases from 
1=(1 )=(  1)
to 1=(1 )=[   1   (   )]. Finally, we substitute (B5) into (24) and manipulate the
equation to obtain the equilibrium rm size:
xtly;t =

1 
=(1 ) +
 
1  
A

xt
1 + 

1 + 
1 
 1

 , (B6)
which continues to be increasing in the level of agricultural technology A.
Given that the dynamics of xt is still given by (A9) in the pre-industrial era, the rm
size xtly;t gradually increases towards the threshold in (A10) to trigger the takeo¤ as before.
The only di¤erence is that as xt increases overtime, ly;t in (B6) is gradually decreasing from
ly in (27) to l

y in (31) (instead of jumping from ly to l

y at the time of the takeo¤). This
additional dynamics in ly;t gives rise to negative growth in the industrial output per capita
before the takeo¤, which is less realistic than the dynamics in the baseline model.
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